Abstract. We observe that the definitions of security in the computational complexity proof models of Bellare & Rogaway (1993) and Canetti & Krawczyk (2001) require two partners in the presence of a malicious adversary to accept the same session key, which we term a key sharing requirement. We then revisit the Bellare-Rogaway three-party key distribution (3PKD) protocol and the Jeong-Katz-Lee two-party authenticated key exchange protocol T S2, which carry claimed proofs of security in the Canetti & Krawczyk (2001) model and the Bellare & Rogaway (1993) model respectively. We reveal previously unpublished flaws in these protocols where we demonstrate that both protocols fail to satisfy the definition of security in the respective models. We present a new 3PKD protocol as an improvement with a proof of security in the Canetti & Krawczyk (2001) model and a simple fix to the specification of protocol T S2. We also identify several variants of the key sharing requirement and present a brief discussion.
Introduction
The treatment of computational complexity analysis for key establishment protocols was made popular by Bellare & Rogaway [5] in 1993, who provided the first formal definition for a model of adversary capabilities with an associated definition of security (which we refer to as the BR93 model in this paper). An extension of the BR93 model was used to analyse a three-party server-based key distribution (3PKD) protocol by Bellare & Rogaway [6] , which we refer to as the BR95 model. A more recent revision to the model was proposed in 2000 by Bellare, Pointcheval and Rogaway [4] , hereafter referred to as the BPR2000 model. In independent yet related work, Bellare, Canetti, & Krawczyk [3] build on the BR93 model and introduce a modular proof model. However, some drawbacks with this formulation were discovered and this modular proof model was subsequently modified by Canetti & Krawczyk [8] , and will be referred to as the CK2001 model in this paper.
We observe that the definitions of security in the BR93, BR95, BPR2000 and CK2001 models have two basic requirements, namely: two parties who have completed matching sessions (i.e., partners) are required to accept the same session key (which we term a key sharing requirement) and the key secrecy requirement (also known as implicit key authentication [16, Definition 12.6] ) whereby no adversary or anyone other than the legitimate parties involved will learn about the session key at the end of a protocol run. Although the key sharing requirement seems straight-forward, there are actually a number of possible variants of this requirement. We identify several variants of the key sharing requirement and present a brief discussion.
In this work, we revisit the Bellare-Rogaway 3PKD protocol [6] and the authenticated key exchange protocol T S2 due to Jeong, Katz, & Lee [14] . The 3PKD protocol was proven secure in the BR95 model and subsequently Tin, Boyd, & Gonzalez-Nieto [20] provided a claimed proof of security for the same protocol in the CK2001 model. Protocol T S2 carries a claimed proof of security in the BR93 model, but uses a different definition of partnership than that given in the original model description.
We reveal previously unpublished flaws in these protocols, whereby we demonstrate that both protocols violate the definition of security in the CK2001 and BR93 models respectively. The attack we present on the 3PKD protocol is similar to the attack on the Otway-Rees key establishment protocol [17] revealed by Fabrega, Herzog, & Guttman [12] , in which they showed that a malicious adversary is able to make the initiator and the responder agree on a different session key by asking a trusted third party (i.e., server) to create multiple session keys in response to the same message.
This paper is organized into the following sections. Section 2 provides an informal overview of the proof models. Section 3 describes the 3PKD protocol, describes an example execution of the protocol to demonstrate how the 3PKD protocol is insecure in the CK2001 model, and presents a new provably-secure 3PKD protocol in the CK2001 model. Section 4 describes protocol T S2, describes an example execution of the protocol to demonstrate how protocol T S2 is insecure in the BR93 model, and provides a simple fix to the protocol specification. Section 5 presents a discussion on the four variants of the key sharing requirement that we have identified. Section 6 presents the conclusions.
The Proof Models
In this section, an informal overview of the BR93, BR95, BPPR2000 models [4] [5] [6] and the CK2001 model [3, 8] is presented.
Bellare-Rogaway Models
In the BR93, BR95, and BPR2000 models, the adversary A is defined to be a probabilistic machine that is in control of all communications between parties by interacting with a set of Π i U1,U2 oracles (i.e., Π i U1,U2 is defined to be the i th instantiation of a principal U 1 in a specific protocol run and U 2 is the principal with whom U 1 wishes to establish a secret key). The oracle queries are shown in Table 1 .
Send(U1, U2, i, m)This query to oracle Π i U 1 ,U 2 computes a response according to the protocol specification and decision on whether to accept or reject yet, and returns them to the adversary A. If the client oracle, Π i U 1 ,U 2 , has either accepted with some session key or terminated, this will be made known to A. Reveal(U1, U2, i) The client oracle, Π i U 1 ,U 2 , upon receiving this query and if it has accepted and holds some session key, will send this session key back to A. This query is known as a Session-Key Reveal in the CK2001 model. Corrupt(U1, KE) This query allows A to corrupt the principal U1 at will, and thereby learn the complete internal state of the corrupted principal. The corrupt query also gives A the ability to overwrite the long-lived key of the corrupted principal with any value of her choice (i.e. KE).
Test(U1, U2, i)
This query is the only oracle query that does not correspond to any of A's abilities. If Π i U 1 ,U 2 has accepted with some session key and is being asked a Test(U1, U2, i) query, then depending on a randomly chosen bit b, A is given either the actual session key or a session key drawn randomly from the session key distribution. Table 1 . Informal description of the oracle queries Security depends on the notions of partnership of oracles and indistinguishability of session keys. The definition of partnership is used in the definition of security to restrict the adversary's Reveal and Corrupt queries to oracles that are not partners of the oracle whose key the adversary is trying to guess.
BR93 partnership is defined using the notion of matching conversations, where a conversation is defined to be the sequence of messages sent and received by an oracle. The sequence of messages exchanged (i.e., only the Send oracle queries) are recorded in the transcript, T . At the end of a protocol run, T will contain the record of the Send queries and the responses as shown in Figure 1 . Definition 1 gives a simplified definition of matching conversations for the case of the protocol shown in Figure 1 .
Definition 1 (BR93 Definition of Matching Conversations [5] ) Let n be the maximum number of sessions between any two parties in the protocol run. Run the protocol shown in Figure 1 in the presence of a malicious adversary A and consider an initiator oracle Π [5] BR95 partnership is defined using a partner function, which uses the transcript to determine the partner of an oracle. However, no explicit definition of partnership was provided in the original paper since there is no single partner function fixed for any protocol. Instead, security is defined predicated on the existence of a suitable partner function. However, such a partner definition can easily go wrong. One such example is the partner function described in the original BR95 paper for the 3PKD protocol [6] , which was later found to be flawed [10] . BPR2000 partnership is defined using session identifiers (SIDs) where SIDs are suggested to be the concatenation of messages exchanged during the protocol run. In this model, an oracle who has accepted will hold the associated session key, a SID and a partner identifier (PID). Definition 2 describes the definition of partnership in the BPR2000 model. Note that any oracle that has accepted will have at most one partner, if any at all. 
Canetti-Krawczyk Model
In the CK2001 model, there are two adversarial models, namely the UM and the AM. Let A UM denote the adversary in the UM, and A AM denote the adversary in the AM . The difference between A AM and A UM lies in their powers. Table 2 provides an informal description of the oracle queries allowed for A AM and A UM .
Session-State Reveal An oracle, upon receiving this query and if it has neither accepted nor held some session key, will return all its internal state (including any ephemeral parameters but not long-term secret parameters) to the adversary.
Send
Equivalent to the Send query in Table 1 . However, AAM is restricted to only delay, delete, and relay messages but not to fabricate any messages or send a message more than once. Session − Key Reveal, Corrupt, and Test queries are equivalent to those queries listed in Table 1 . Table 2 . Informal description of the oracle queries allowed for AAM and AUM A protocol that is proven to be secure in the AM can be translated to a provably secure protocol in the UM with the use of an authenticator. We require the definitions of an emulator, and an authenticator as given in Definitions 3 and 4 respectively. [3] ) Let π and π be two n-party protocols where π and π are protocols in the AM and the U M respectively. π is said to emulate π if for any A U M , there exists an A AM , such that for all input vectors → m, no polyomial time adversary can distinguish the cumulative outputs of all parties and the adversary between the AM and the U M with more than negligible probability.
Definition 3 (Definition of an Emulator

Definition 4 (CK2001 Definition of an Authenticator [8])
An authenticator is defined to be a mapping transforming a protocol π AM in the AM to a protocol π UM in the UM such that π UM emulates π AM .
In other words, the security proof of a UM protocol depends on the security proofs of the MT-authenticators used and that of the associated AM protocol. If any of these proofs break down, then the proof of the UM protocol is invalid. Partnership in the CK2001 model can be defined using the notion of matching sessions, as desribed in Definition 5.
Definition 5 (Matching Sessions [8] ) Two sessions are said to be matching if they have the same session identifiers (SIDs) and corresponding partner identifiers (PIDs).
In the Bellare-Rogaway and the CK2001 models, SIDs are unique and known to everyone (including A). Hence, session keys cannot be included as part of SIDs in the protocols. In the CK2001 model, A chooses unique SIDs for each pair of participants, although, in practice, SIDs are generally agreed using some unique contributions from each participant.
Definition of Freshness
Freshness is used to identify the session keys about which A ought not to know anything because A has not revealed any oracles that have accepted the key and has not corrupted any principals knowing the key. Definition 6 describes freshness, which depends on the notion of partnership. Note that we do not consider the notion of forward secrecy in this paper, otherwise, the definition of freshness would be slightly different. 
Definition of Security
Security in the four models is defined using the game G, played between A and a collection of player oracles. A runs the game G, whose setting is explained in Table 3 .
A is able to send any oracle queries at will. Stage 2: At some point during G, A will choose a fresh session on which to be tested and send a Test query to the fresh oracle associated with the test session. Depending on the randomly chosen bit b, A is given either the actual session key or a session key drawn randomly from the session key distribution. Stage 3: A continues making any oracle queries at will but cannot make Corrupt or Reveal queries that trivially expose the test session key. Stage 4: Eventually, A terminates the game simulation and outputs a bit b , which is its guess of the value of b. 
Definitions 7, 8, and 9 describe the definition of security for the BR95 model, the BPR2000 model, and both the BR93 and CK2001 models respectively. 
Bellare-Rogaway 3PKD Protocol
In this section, we demonstrate that the 3PKD protocol is insecure in the CK2001 model, contradicting the claim by Tin et al. [20] . We point out that the existing proof breaks down because the uniqueness of SIDs is not ensured. We then describe the MAC-based MT-authenticator [8] , and protocol AM-3PKD proven secure in the AM [20] . By applying the MT-authenticator on protocol AM-3PKD, we obtain a new provably-secure 3PKD protocol in the CK2001 model.
3PKD Protocol
The 3PKD protocol in Figure 2 is the MAC key shared between A and S, and both keys are independent of each other.
The protocol begins by having A randomly select a k-bit challenge R A and send it to the B with whom she desires to communicate. Upon receiving the message R A from A, B also randomly selects a k-bit challenge R B and sends R B together with R A as a message (R A , R B ) to the server S. S, upon receiving the message (R A , R B ) from B, runs the session key generator to obtain a session key Tin et al. [20] suggest that SIDs can be constructed on the fly using unique contributions from both the initiator and the responder (i.e., sid A = (R A , R B ) and sid B = (R A , R B ) respectively). We observe that the existing proof fails because the current construction of SIDs does not guarantee uniqueness. Our observation supports the findings of Choo et al. [10] that it does not seem possible to define a unique SID in the existing 3PKD protocol.
New Attack on 3PKD Protocol
A New Provably-Secure 3PKD Protocol in the CK2001 (UM)
A quick fix to the 3PKD protocol is to require the server to store every message processed and not issue different session keys for the same input message received, similar to the approach taken by Backes [1] in his proof of security for the Otway-Rees protocol in the cryptographic library, which has a provably secure cryptographic implementation. However, we argue that this assumption only works well within a confined implementation and will not scale well to a more realistic environment with a large number of participating parties and a substantial level of traffic to any one server.
Another possible fix would be to introduce two extra messages for key confirmation, which would ensure that both parties have the assurance that the other (partner) party is able to compute the (same) session key. However, this would increase the computational load of both the initiator and the responder.
As an improvement, we present an improved provably-secure protocol in the CK2001 model by applying the Canetti-Krawczyk MAC-based MT-authenticator to the Tin-Boyd-Gonzalez-Nieto protocol AM-3PKD. Figure 6 describes the resultant UM protocol. In this protocol, S will generate a random nonce R S each time a session key is generated. R S will be sent together with the associated session key to both A and B together with the contributions by both A and B (i.e., R A and R B ). Within the new protocol, the only values that A and B can be sure are unique are R A , R B , and R S , and hence SIDs are constructed using these values (i.e., uniqueness of SIDs is ensured).
Intuitively, the attack outlined in Figure 3 will no longer be valid, since a new nonce is generated each time a new session key is generated. Note that there is a subtle difference between our new 3PKD protocol (as shown in Figure 6 ) and the fix proposed by Choo et al. [10] . In their fix, S does not generate a random nonce R S each time a session key is generated. Hence, the attack outlined in Figure 3 is still valid against their fix. However, their protocol is secure in the BPR2000 model (in which their protocol is proven secure), since the BPR2000 partnership (i.e., Definition 8) requires two parties to have matching SIDs, agreeing PIDs, and the same session key in order to be partners. Clearly, in the context of our attack, the two oracles are not BPR2000 partners. Hence, the BPR2000 security is not violated. Table 4 presents a comparison of the computational loads between our new 3PKD protocol and three other similar server-based three-party key establishment protocols, namely the Yahalom protocol [7] , the Bauer-Berson-Feiertag protocol [2] and the Otway-Rees protocol [17] . We observe that the three other protocols are unable to satisfy the key share requirement in the presence of a malicious adversary (without making some "impractical" assumption -requiring the server to store every message processed and not issuing different session keys for the same message). From Table 4 , we also observe that the computational load of our new 3PKD protocol is comparable to those of the other protocols, yet provides a tighter definition of security (i.e., secure in the sense of Definition 9). Key establishment Key establishment (however, parties who complete matching sessions (partners), are not guaranteed to share the same session key.) Table 4 . Comparison of the computational loads 4 Jeong-Katz-Lee Protocol T S2 Figure 7 describes protocol T S2 [14] . All arithmetic is performed modulo a large prime p with q being the prime order of g. The protocol uses a different partnering function, as described in Definition 10. Both the initiator and responder principals, A and B, are assumed to have a public/private key pair (P A , S A ) and (P B , S B ) respectively. At the end of the protocol execution, both A and B accept with the session key Fig. 7 . Jeong-Katz-Lee protocol T S2 Figure 8 desribes the execution of protocol T S2 in the presence of a malicious adversary A, where A intercepts both messages and sends fabricated messages g RA ||1 and 1||g RB to both B and A respectively. 
New Attack on Protocol T S2
in violation of requirement 2a in Definition 9.
A simple fix to protocol T S2 is to include validity checking of the received messages by the recipient, as shown in Figure 9 . The validity checking ensures that the messages received by each party are in the group and that the bit lengths of the messages received by each party are correct. Intuitively, the attack outlined in Figure 8 will no longer be valid since the fabricated messages sent by the adversary will fail the validity check. Let BL(·) denote the bit length of some message.
Check whether g We may speculate that if the protocol designers fail to spot this inadequancy in the specification of their protocols, the protocol implementers are also highly unlikely to spot this inadequancy. Flaws in security protocol proofs or protocol specifications themselves certainly will have a damaging effect on the credibility of provably-secure protocols in the real world [19] .
The key sharing requirement varies between the BR93, BR95, BPR2000, and CK2001 models. In this section, we identify four possible variants of the key sharing requirement, as shown in Table 5 . Fabrega et al. [12] have also observed the ambiguity surrounding key sharing requirements (which they term key authentication) in the context of the Otway-Rees protocol. Although they did not see this as a serious flaw, they did highlight the lack of understanding of the protocol and the need to identify exactly what goals a protocol achieves.
Variant
Required in KSR1 Two communicating parties completing matching sessions in the absence of a malicious adversary accept the same session key.
BR95 model.
KSR2
Two communicating parties completing matching sessions in the presence of a malicious adversary accept the same session key.
BR93, BPR2000, CK2001 models.
KSR3 One party is assured that a second (possibly unidentified) party is able to compute a particular secret session key.
Optional in any of the BR93, BR95, BPR2000, or CK2001 models. KSR4 One party is assured that a second (possibly unidentified) party actually has possession of a particular secret session key.
Not achievable in reductionist proof approach for protocols, as shown below. Table 5 . Variants of key sharing requirement KSR1 is a completeness requirement, which ensures that a key establishment protocol is behaving correctly. We advocate that KSR2 is a practical functional requirement and depending on the individual implementation, KSR2 requirement can be as important as the key secrecy requirement. Consider the scenario of a real world implementation of one key establishment protocol that does not provide the KSR2 requirement: two partners after completing matching sessions, are unable to share the same session key. From the protocol implementers' perspective, the usefulness (or practicality) of such a key establishment protocol will be questionable.
KSR3 is a weaker version of KSR4, where KSR4 is the key confirmation goal given in [16, Definition 12.7] . KSR4 is generally not achievable in the setting of the reductionist proof approach for protocols for the following reason. In order for one party, A to be assured that a second (possibly unidentified) party, B, actually has possession of the secret session key, A would need to send to B some information derived from the key, such as the encryption of some message with the secret session key. However, in the context of the proof simulation, A can ask a Send query using the test session key obtained from a Test query, and determine whether the test session key it was given (by the simulator) was real or random. Consequently, such information renders the protocol insecure as Adv A (k) will be non-negligible. KSR3 is a weaker version of KSR4, where the latter variant is the key confirmation goal given by Menezes, Oorschot, & Vanstone [16, Definition 12.7] . Note that KSR4 is not achievable in the setting of the reductionist proof approach for protocols for the following reason. Recall that security in the BR93, BR95, BPR2000, and CK2001 models is defined using a game simulation, G, played between A and a collection of player oracles. Success of A in G is quantified in terms of A's advantage in distinguishing whether A receives a real key or a random value from the game simulator. In order for one party, A to be assured that a second (possibly unidentified) party, B, actually has possession of a particular secret session key, A would need to send to B some information derived from the key, such as the encryption of some message with the secret session key, as shown in Figure 10 , which describes the Yahalom protocol [7] In the protocol, we observe that B is assured that A actually has possession of the same secret session key, SK AB 1 . However, in the context of the proof simulation, the adversary A can ask a Send query using the test session key obtained from a Test query, and determine whether the test session key it was given (by the simulator) was real or random. Consequently, such information renders the protocol insecure as A will have a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing the Test key received from the game simulator.
Recommendations We would recommend that the proof models allow different options for the key sharing requirement in their formulation. KSR1 is a minimum requirement as it ensures the (basic) correctness of a protocol, KSR3 implies KSR2, and KSR2 implies KSR1. Protocols proven secure in such a model must indicate which variant of the key sharing requirement is satisfied.
Conclusion
A detailed study of the Bellare-Rogaway 3PKD protocol and the Jeong-KatzLee protocol T S2 was made. We demonstrated that both protocols fail to achieve the key sharing requirement in the presence of a malicious adversary, in violation of the definition of security in their respective models. Despite the importance of proofs in assuring protocol implementers of the security properties of protocols, we conclude that specifying correct proofs remains a difficult problem.
As an improvement, we presented a new 3PKD protocol with a proof of security in the CK2001 model. A comparison with three existing three-party server-based protocols reveals that the computational load of our new 3PKD protocol is no more than that of the three other protocols, yet ensures that a stronger version of the key sharing requirement is satisfied. We also proposed a simple fix to the specification of protocol T S2 and identified four possible variants of the key sharing requirement. As a result of this work, we would recommend that the proof models for key establishment protocols allow the various options of the key sharing requirement, depending on the individual needs of the protocol implementations and applications.
